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Abstract 
 
This paper maintains that although the citizenship regime of Montenegro was generated 
amidst domestic political competition, it has also significantly been affected by regional and 
international political forces. Applying Bellamy’s concept of the lineages of citizenship to the 
case of Montenegro, this study explains how citizenship polices were used to manage the 
fragile political milieu within this weak and unconsolidated post-Yugoslav state. Further 
explanations for the restrictiveness of Montenegro’s citizenship regime are based on the 
legacies of the different Yugoslav ‘citizenship constellations’. Yet as a consequence of the 
country’s aspirations to join the European Union, the rigid citizenship regime of Montenegro 
remains permeable to international norms and influence. However, this ostensible 
normative elasticity does not make Montenegrin citizenship more liberal, as barriers for 
naturalisation remain high. 
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Introduction 
 
The fall of the Iron Curtain and the break-ups of multinational federations in post-
communist Europe were followed by the salience of citizenship both as a determinant of 
membership to a community and as a prerequisite for the exercise of political rights. The 
link between the normative aspects of citizenship and these issues is reflected in Katherine 
Verdery’s(1998, p.294) observation that ‘the process of writing new constitutions enabled 
ambitious politicians to manipulate the very definition of citizenship’. The normative 
reinvention of post-communist states through what Hayden (1992) termed as 
‘constitutional nationalism’ did not only seek to establish a congruence between the 
boundaries of states and the predominant ethnic groups living therein, but it also aimed at 
excluding those groups who posed a ‘threat’ to the unconsolidated polities by virtue of their 
association with the dissolved (or dissolving) state.1 The most obvious consequence of this 
dynamic was the radical increase in the number of stateless persons in the successor states 
of the ‘fallen’ federations, because many people considered citizens in the old states were 
not granted access to citizenship in the new ones(Weissbrodt 2008, p.94).  
 All of these dynamics were reflected in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, 
which brought seven states into being. The differences in how these states defined 
themselves legally and politically and in how they constructed their perceived 
ethnic/national identity, had a large impact on their citizenship regimes. Such was the case 
of Montenegro, the smallest of the former Yugoslav republics, which carved its statehood 
out of the dissolution of two federations and one state union,2 in the past two decades. 
From 1997 until the country became independent in 2006, Montenegrin politics was 
                                                 
1
 The most cited examples include Slovenia (successor state of Yugoslavia), and Estonia and Latvia (Baltic 
states). 
2
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro. 
dominated by strong internal divisions over whether Montenegro should be an independent 
state or not and an equally intense discord over whether Montenegrins were a separate 
nation or a sub-group of Serbs (Morrison 2009). The intensity of internal Montenegrin 
struggle was mirrored in the results of the 2006 referendum, whereby the number of voters 
that supported Montenegro’s independence exceeded the required threshold of 55 per cent 
set by the European Union by 2,095 votes (CDT 2006). The restrictive Montenegrin 
citizenship regime, established between 2006 and 2008, is a consequence of the country’s 
political trajectory.  
 Supplementing Džankid (2010;2010a), this paper ascertains that, while being 
essentially a reflection of the domestic political competition, the current citizenship regime 
of Montenegro has also substantially been shaped by exogenous influences. On the one 
hand, ‘citizenship policies in Montenegro were generated by the political circumstances 
surrounding their adoption as tools of political manoeuvering’ (Džankid 2010a: 5). On the 
other hand, legacies of the different Yugoslav ‘citizenship constellations’ (Baubock 2010) 
contributed to the deliberate rigidity of Montenegro’s citizenship regime, while the prospect 
of Montenegro’s alignment in the European ‘citizenship constellation’ made the domestic 
regulation of citizenship permeable to international norms. Hence citizenship regime echoes 
both domestic and foreign policy concerns in this post-Yugoslav state.   
 As there is no single political or legal theory that fully explains the multiple forces 
that mould the citizenship regimes of new states,  this paper combines Bellamy’s (2004) 
‘lineages of citizenship’ and  Baubock’s (2010) ‘constellations of citizenship’. While the 
former unveils the internal dynamics of the current citizenship regime, the latter helps to 
understand how external influences have affected citizenship legislation in a polity that was 
historically a member inplurinational states, and that currently aspires to membership in the 
European Union (EU). 
  The concept of the lineages of citizenship analyses the normative elements of 
citizenship by looking at interactions between ‘state and society within a given national 
political community’ (Bellamy 2004, p.5). It explores the active relationship between the 
legal, political and identity/emotional aspects of citizenship. This approach unveils the 
extent to which the political circumstances have shaped the regulation of citizenship, and – 
in turn – triggers questions about what layer of identity the citizenship legislation in fact 
encapsulates. Not only does the notion of citizenship represent the idea of membership in a 
polity in both its legal and emotional aspects, but it also establishes the prerogatives for the 
conferral of political rights and duties upon the members of that polity (Marshall 
&Bottomore 1992). Hence, citizenship is intimately related to political participation, through 
which individual members of the community exercise their will, which is eventually 
translated into political power. Given the small size of Montenegro, and its political 
dynamics, the issue of voting arithmetic has been of particular significance. Therefore, 
access to citizenship, and the relationship between citizenship and the individuals’ 
perceived ethnic or national identities - the combination of which would decide who could 
vote and for whom – have been a burning topic on Montenegro’s political agenda since the 
start of the political divisions in 1997. 
 Yet, for the purposes of this study, which also takes into account the external 
alignments of citizenship, it is essential to supplement Bellamy’s analysis of citizenship with 
Baubock’s (2010) concept of ‘citizenship constellations’. In seeking to explain the liaisons 
that individuals have with multiple states, Baubock defines ‘citizenship constellations’ as 
structures ‘in which individuals are simultaneously linked to several such political entities, so 
that their legal rights and duties are determined not only by one political authority, but by 
several’ (Baubock 2010, p.848). In spite of being conceived as a theory that explains the 
relationship of individuals (migrants) to multiple polities, Baubock’s ‘citizenship 
constellations’ may as well be applied to polities, which are members in confederal or 
federal states, or supranational entities. It is particularly useful for studying postcommunist 
countries, many of which have seceded from multinational federations and/or integrated in 
the EU, thus having an experience of a ‘citizenship constellation’. Although Montenegro 
does not belong to any such ‘citizenship constellation’ at present, it did so in the past, and it 
aspires towards EU membership, implying that it will in the future. Hence the current 
citizenship regime of Montenegro and any amendments to it have been affected by the 
competing streams of the legacies of constellations past and the prospects of the 
constellation future.  
  
2. When citizenship hits home: political management and categories of citizenship in an 
unconsolidated state 
 
With the mushrooming of states in the post-communist Europe, matters of status, access 
and membership became key elements of state and nation building. The legal aspect of 
citizenship conferred rights upon citizens, and established prerogatives for their 
participation in the functioning of the polity. The political aspect of citizenship, which entails 
active participation, translated the individual’s preferences in political power. In the 
Balkans, voting for a certain political party is often seen as an affirmation of an individual’s 
ethnic or national belonging in addition to being a declaration of an ideological standpoint 
(although the degrees of this nuance differ from country to country).3 The politicization of 
ethnicity at the time of the divide over statehood and identity in Montenegro took its toll on 
the citizenship regime (Džankid 2010; 2010a).  
 Montenegrin independence in 2006 was the first step towards the establishment of 
the new country’s citizenship regime. Due to the internal political division, Montenegro’s 
constitution purports a ‘civic state’, whereby sovereignty is vested in the ‘citizens having 
Montenegrin nationality’ (art. 2). Such a definition has had two implications on the 
conception of citizenship in Montenegro. First, the ‘civic’ nature of Montenegro’s state was 
not only a reflection of the internal polarisation and an attempt to placate it, but also a 
barrier against the claims of Serbs in Montenegro to be recognised as a constituent people, 
which would lead to multipartite power-sharing (Džankid 2011). Second, the very citizenship 
regime has come to encompass the notions of ‘citizen’ (građanin) and ‘national’ 
(državljanin);4 the former denoting a broader universalistic concept of citizenship, and the 
latter being the formal relationship between the individual and the state strictosensu. Due 
to the evolving corpse of Montenegro’s legislation, these two elements of Montenegro’s 
citizenship regime have given rise to distinct sets of rights related to individuals’ 
participation in political life.  
 
2.1. ‘Civic’ state as a response to interethnic divisions and competing claims to power 
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 This is particularly true in culturally more diverse successor states of the former Yugoslavia – Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Voting along ethnic/national lines also happens with minority 
communities. For more details see Stojarovà& Emerson 2010. 
4
The noun ‘national’ is used in this paper to denote the legal link between the individual and the state. It bears 
no connotation of ethnic or national belonging.  
 
According to the 2007 Constitution and the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act, nationality in 
Montenegro explicitly denotes the relationship between individuals and the state, rather 
than national or ethnic belonging. This is an important aspect of Montenegro’s citizenship 
regime, since no ethnic or national group forms the majority in the country. In the context 
of Bellamy’s lineages of citizenship, the normative stipulation of nationality in Montenegro 
contains identification with the state, and thus an ostensibly ‘civic’ identity. Yet, the 
avoidance of ethnic elements in citizenship legislation, which is not the case in some other 
post-Yugoslav states (e.g., Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia), was both a tool for managing 
interethnic relations in a politically polarised society and a barrier to competing claims to 
power by these groups. In this respect, Montenegro’s citizenship regime is merely ‘non-
ethnic’, and not universalistic as the term ‘civic’ might imply. This is best mirrored in the 
relationship between citizenship and minority status and rights.  
 Montenegro’s 2006 Law on Minority Rights and Freedoms stipulates the 
inextricability of nationality and minority status, revealing the inextricability of the ‘civic’ 
and ‘ethnic’ elements of citizenship in Montenegro. Pursuant to art. 2 of the Law, a minority 
is defined as ‘a group of nationals of Montenegro, fewer in numbers than the prevailing 
population, who have common ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics, different from 
the remaining population, who are historically connected to Montenegro and who are 
motivated by the desire to preserve national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity’. According toDžankid (2011), this law was adopted in the immediate vanguard of 
the referendum on independence. As such, it aimed at showing the international 
community that Montenegro is a positive example of interethnic relations in the Balkans 
and at attracting the votes of non-Christian Orthodox minorities,5 who proved pivotal in 
reaching the threshold of votes for independence. However, the intimate relation between 
nationality and minority status in Montenegro has been criticised by the Council of Europe, 
since ‘a general provision dealing with the scope of application of minority rights is not 
appropriate as these rights are human rights and not rights of citizens’(CoE 2008, p. 9). 
 Due to this criticism the 2007 Constitution of Montenegro stipulates no overt link 
between nationality and the status of minority. Instead, it alludes to ‘free and equal citizens 
(građani), representatives of peoples and national minorities living in Montenegro: 
Montenegrins, Serbs, Bosniaks, Albanians, Muslims, and others’ (Preamble). It foresees the 
observance of international standards for the protection of human and minority rights, 
along with ‘authentic representation’ of minorities in the Parliament of Montenegro and 
other institutions of local administration where minorities form a significant portion of the 
population (art. 79). The latter provision generated an ongoing debate in Montenegro as to 
how to define ‘authentic representation’. The Montenegrin electoral system is based on 
proportional representation, with special provisions for representatives of the Albanian 
minority.6 As such, this system contains no legally binding provisions for ensuring either 
‘proportional’ or ‘authentic’ representation to all of the minorities in Montenegro.  
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 The main protagonists of the Montenegrin divide - Montenegrins and Serbs - are, in principle, Christian 
Orthodox. The groups that were at the margins of the identity debate (that is, Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, 
Muslims, Roma) were not Christian Orthodox. Thus, the pre-independence legislation in Montenegro assumed 
that minorities were non- Christian Orthodox (see: Šiška and Dimitrova 2002). 
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 The 1998 Election Law guaranteed the Albanian minority five seats in the republic’s Assembly, and a variant 
of this provision has been retained ever since. 
 Nonetheless, the concerns over ‘authentic representation’ have been raised by other 
minorities, such as Serbs, Bosniaks and Muslims. Particular, after the 2006 referendum, the 
Serbs have emerged as the numerically largest minority group in Montenegro, counting for 
almost one third of the country’s population.7 Yet, rather than being an exclusively ethnic 
identity, as is the case with Serbia proper, the meaning of ‘Serb’ in Montenegro also 
contains a political dimension created during the division over statehood and identity. The 
division gradually bifurcated the previous meaning of ‘Montenegrin’ identity (which was not 
exclusive of a ‘Serb’ component’ until the late 1990s), associating ‘Montenegrins’ with 
independence, and ‘Serbs’ with the strife to preserve the common state (Morrisson 2009; 
Roberts 2007; Džankid 2010).  
 Following the adoption of the 2007 Constitution, political representatives of Serbs in 
Montenegro advocated that the Serb population should be given the status of a constituent 
people in Montenegro (YIHR 2010, p.19). This request has generated an ongoing public 
debate, whereby the Montenegrin government claims that granting Serbs the status of 
constituent people is contrary to the ‘civic’ principle of Montenegro’s constitution (Vukovid 
in RFE 2011).  What is understood as the ‘civic’ principle in Montenegro is that the state 
‘belongs’ to its citizens equally, which precludes an overt power sharing agreement. 
Granting the Serbs in Montenegro the status of a ‘constituent people’ would ethnify the 
Constitution and the state. That is, all the substantial ethnic/national groups in Montenegro, 
including Montenegrins, Bosniaks, Muslims, Albanians and Croats would likelyrequest to be 
defined as constituent peoples. Moreover, given that ethnification of the constitution in a 
plurinational state (by granting the status of ‘constituent people’ to any group) would 
inevitably lead to multipartite power-sharing, it would generate a number of institutional 
deadlocks and thus decelerate the process of reform (as is the case in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or Macedonia). As a consequence, the legal definition of Montenegro as the 
state constituted of its ‘citizens’ was a response to the internal political and ethnic 
polarisation, as well as a tool for managing the complex multiethnic composite of this 
Balkan state of less than one million inhabitants.  
 
2.2. Citizenship and participation: in the labyrinth of franchise 
 
Given the complex political milieu in Montenegro, participation is intimately related 
to voting arithmetic. Thus, franchise can best illustrate the interplay between the legal, 
political, and identity layers of citizenship. Owing to the small size of Montenegro, individual 
votes count more as a percentage of the overall citizenry than they would in a more 
populous country.8In the pre-referendum period, the active (participatory) element of 
citizenship ascribed individuals to either the pro-independence/pro-Montenegrin or the 
pro-union/pro-Serb camp, thus becoming an identity marker. While the identity debate in 
Montenegro decreased in intensity after 2006, some of its elements remained significant in 
the subsequent election rounds (e.g. state symbols, the national anthem, etc.).  
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 According to the 2003 census (Monstat 2003), the ethnic composite in Montenegro is: Montenegrins (43.2 
per cent), followed by Serbs (32 per cent), Bosniaks (7.8 per cent), Albanians (5 per cent), Muslims (4 per cent), 
Croats (1.1 per cent), and Roma (0.4 per cent). The results of this census are radically different than the ones 
of the 1991 census (FSO 1991), whereby the largest group were Montenegrins (61.9 per cent), followed by 
Serbs (9.3 per cent), Muslims (14.7 per cent), Albanian (6.7 per cent), and Croat (1 per cent). The different 
results indicate the politicization of ethnicity in Montenegro during the debate over statehood and identity. 
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 On 23 May 2010, the number of electors in Montenegro was 494,289 (CDT 2010).  
Consequently, the constitutional provisions regulating suffrage contain a barrier to 
the exercise of voting rights. On the one hand, the Constitution of Montenegro guarantees 
universal suffrage to the nationals (državljani) of Montenegro who have reached 18 years of 
age. On the other hand, the Constitution also stipulates a two-year residence requirement 
in Montenegro in addition to Montenegrin nationality as a prerequisite for voting rights 
(art.45). This provision has been criticised by the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe-Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR) as a limitation 
on fundamental rights in the Constitution, because ‘the right to elect and be elected should 
be granted to all citizens as a fundamental human right, and any practical considerations for 
the implementation of this right should be addressed in legislation’ (2009: 3).  
The 2007 Constitution of Montenegro made a departure from the 1992 Constitution. 
Art. 32 of the 1992 Constitution stipulated that electoral rights were granted to citizens 
(građani) of Montenegro, with no provision connecting residence to the exercise of 
electoral rights. The difference in the regulation of political participation has certainly been 
induced by the internal Montenegrin divisions and the quest for statehood. In fact, the Law 
on the Registry of Residence and Temporary Stay of 2005, in force at the time of the 
adoption of the 2007 Constitution, defined the category of citizen (građanin) as the 
‘Montenegrin citizen (državljanin) and the national (državljanin) of the other member state,9 
with residence in the Republic of Montenegro’ (art. 5). The main difference between the 
two legal orders is the definition of the concept of citizenship, which mirrored the political 
context in Montenegro. In practice, in line with the 1992 Constitution, and the election 
legislation in force at the time when Montenegro was a party to the State Union, nationals 
(državljani) of Serbia resident in Montenegro were included in the register of electors.  
At the time of theApril 2008presidential elections, electoral legislation was not fully 
in line with the new Constitution (OSCE 2008). In order to avoid criticism over 
disenfranchisement by international actors, Montenegro retained voting rights for nationals 
(državljani) of the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia who previously fell under 
the category of citizens (građani) and with residence in Montenegro. 
However, the need to harmonise the laws adopted when Montenegro was a part of 
the common state with Serbia with the new Constitution gave birth to the new Law on the 
Register of Electors, a few weeks after the April 2008 elections. The new law was in line with 
the Constitution in that it provided voting rights to nationals (državljani) of Montenegro, 
with residence in Montenegro for two years. Immediately after the adoption of this law, 
municipal authorities disenfranchised voters who did not have Montenegrin nationality 
(državljanstvo), but who were registered electors as citizens (građani) with permanent 
residence in Montenegro. This caused a fierce reaction on the part of the Montenegrin 
opposition, who deemed this to be a part of the government’s strategy to remain in power 
(SNP 2008). The Administrative Court ruled that the disenfranchised voters should be 
reinstated in the register of electors. The Court stated that art. 6, para. 2 of the 2008 Law on 
the Register of Electors which was cited by the municipalities as the basis for 
disenfranchisement regulated the matters related to the inscription of voters in the register 
of electors. The same provision, however, did not grant the municipalities the power to 
delete electors who do not possess Montenegrin citizenship (Administrative Court, 
1329/2008).  
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 In 2005, Montenegro was a member state in the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The state formally 
dissolved on 3 June 2006. 
As a consequence of the tension between the government’s attempts to put an 
emphasis on the independent statehood of Montenegro by granting the right to 
participation only to nationals (državljani), the challenge of implementing such endeavours, 
and the risk of criticism by the international actors because of actions taken to 
disenfranchise electors, in practice citizens of the other successor states of the former 
Yugoslavia were able to vote in 2008 and 2009, along with a number of people with 
unknown citizenship (OSCE 2009). However, no new inscriptions in the Register of Electors 
have been allowed for people resident in Montenegro, but who do not have Montenegrin 
citizenship. This created a misbalance of voting rights in the country. That is, there are 
people who have obtained voting rights in line with the previous legislation and who would 
not have been removed from the register of electors. At the same time, there are people 
who were not granted voting rights, because they do not have Montenegrin citizenship after 
the adoption of the new Law.10 This misbalance of voting rights created a political debate 
that was eventually translated into legislation. In terms of electoral laws, it has been 
decided that the voting rights should be granted to Montenegrin nationals (državljani), but 
that there should be a transition period for the prospective nationals of Montenegro (i.e., 
former ‘citizens’) to regulate their status (Pobjeda,3 February 2010). The latter aspect of this 
debate was enshrined in the 2010 Law on Amendments and Addenda to the Montenegrin 
Citizenship Act as an extension to the deadline for naturalisation of citizens from the 
successor states of the former Yugoslavia stipulated in art. 41 (Džankid 2010). 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
Thus, the case of Montenegro shows the inextricable links between the different 
layers of the notion of citizenship: regulation, participation, and – through participation – 
identity. In law and in practice, Montenegro’s citizenship regime always contained the 
categories ‘citizen’ (građanin) and ‘national’ (državljanin), shown in Table 1 (above). 
However, the definition of these concepts before and after independence has been 
different, in that: a) prior to 2006, the term ‘citizen’ (građanin) denoted ‘nationals’ 
(državljani) of Montenegro and of other republics of the states Montenegro was party to 
who resided in Montenegro; b) after 2006, there is no legal provision that defines who the 
‘citizen’ (građanin) of Montenegro is, despite the common use of this term in legislation; c)  
before 2006, ‘national’ (državljanin) denoted the legal link between both Montenegro and 
the common state (e.g., there was a separate Montenegrin Nationality Law, but the 
passports were Yugoslav). The major consequence of these changes is that after 2006, 
‘national’ (državljanin) has become more commonly used in legislation, particular in relation 
to civic rights. This explicit relationship between the individual and the state has generated 
the exclusion of the pre-2006 citizens (građani) of Montenegro who formally have not 
become nationals of the new state, which international organisations deem controversial in 
light of Montenegro’s transition to democracy (OSCE 2009). Such a situation reflects the 
significance of the legacies of constellations past on a country’s citizenship regime, as well 
the potential for change in view of the prospect of constellations future, analysed in the 
following part of the paper.  
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 For example, two people, who are not citizens of Montenegro but have residence therein, may have 
obtained voting rights in line with the old legislation. Their children, who fulfil the age criterion after the 
adoption of the new law, will not be inscribed in the Register of Electors, as they do not have Montenegrin 
citizenship. 
 
3. The Almagest of citizenship: legacies of constellations past, prospects of constellations 
future  
 
Understanding the citizenship regime of a country, and the conditions that can trigger 
changes to it, assumes an awareness of its position in the ‘citizenship constellations’ 
(Baubock 2010). In post-partition states, citizenship regimes are often construed in view of 
the legacy of federal experience. They also account for the position of the new state within 
the region, and its relation to other states or supranational organisations. Thus, citizenship 
regimes are a sui generis form of foreign policy. Created after multiple partitions, having 
very different relations with other post-Yugoslav countries, and aspiring to EU membership, 
Montenegro is a prime example of the effects of citizenship constellations on a newborn 
country’s citizenship regime.  
   
3.1. Legacies of constellations past 
 
While a member of a common state with Serbia from 1992 to 2006, Montenegro had a two 
tiered citizenship regime (federal and republican). Due to the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s, the citizenship act of the FRY was adopted only in 
1996, and the old socialist legislation was in place at the republican level (see: Štiks 2006; 
Džankid 2010). Yet, by the time the 1996 Citizenship Act entered into force, political 
circumstances in the FRY had significantly changed. A part of the Montenegrin ruling elites 
departed from Miloševid’s politics in 1997, and initiated the process of ‘creeping 
independence’, which resulted in the establishment of a separate Montenegrin foreign 
policy and a republican citizenship regime which conflicted with the federal one. Within this 
context, the 1999 Law on Montenegrin Citizenship became a political tool for the elites in 
relating Montenegro to Serbia and the federation (see: Džankid 2010). The legacies of these 
post-Yugoslav citizenship constellations are mirrored in Montenegro’s current restrictive 
approach to naturalisation. This is best illustrated by an overview of categories of non-
citizens in Montenegro presented in Table 2 (below). 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
 In fact, the status of the large number of people settled in Montenegro during the 
conflicts in the early 1990s (displaced persons), or the conflict in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 
(internally displaced persons) is still a matter of political debates.11As a consequence of the 
action plan of the Montenegrin government, the amendments and addenda to the Law on 
Foreigners (Official Gazette of Montenegro 72/09) enable displaced persons and IDPs to 
register as ‘foreigners with permanent stay’ in Montenegro, thus making them ‘denizens’ in 
light of Hammar’s (1990: 15) definition of the term. This provision grants them a prospect of 
Montenegrin citizenship, following the expiry of the legal deadline of ten years of residence 
from the date of their registration, and subject to other conditions stipulated in the 2008 
Montenegrin Citizenship Act.  
The major problem with the new regulations is the requirement for re-registration of 
those displaced persons and IDPs who do not have ‘residence’ in Montenegro, but only 
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 These people are not covered by the definition of ‘refugee’ in Montenegro, which affects the prospect of 
their admission into Montenegrin citizenship. 
‘temporary stay’ or another type of residence that is not considered ‘legal and 
uninterrupted’.12 That is, persons who have lived in Montenegro ever since their departure 
from their state of origin (which may have occurred up to twenty years ago) will be required 
to reside for another ten years in Montenegro before being able to obtain Montenegrin 
citizenship unless they had formally registered ‘residence’ with the Ministry of Interior upon 
their arrival. By contrast, pursuant to the most recent amendments and addenda to the 
2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act, the citizens of the former Yugoslav republics, who have 
registered ‘residence’ in Montenegro before 03 June 2006 did not need to fulfil the ten year 
residence criterion (art. 41, art. 41a), provided that they do not have the citizenship of their 
state of origin and that they submit their application for naturalisation within a deadline 
prescribed by the law (see Džankid 2010).  
The issue of acceptance of displaced persons and IDPs into the citizenship of 
Montenegro are likely related to the need to politically consolidate the newly established 
state. That is, any significant increase in the number of voters would seriously affect the 
voting arithmetic in Montenegro.13 The majority of the displaced persons are of Serbian 
ethnic origin and thus likely to support the opposition parties. The situation of 10,951 IDPs is 
quite similar, although it appears different (Informacija o preregistraciji 2009). The majority 
of IDPs have declared their ethnic belonging as ‘Montenegrin’ (3,683), followed by the IDP 
RAE population (3,106), and ‘Serb’ (2,728). Ostensibly, the ethnic composition of the IDPs 
might imply that only the ‘Serb’ IDPs would be supportive of the opposition. Still, it is likely 
that many of the ‘Montenegrin’ IDPs would not support the government. This is mostly due 
to their association with Kosovo whose independence is recognised by Montenegro, but is 
still challenged by the Montenegrin opposition parties, which reveals the complexity of the 
post-Yugoslav ‘citizenship constellations’. 
 A further legacy of these post-Yugoslav ‘citizenship constellations’ are the intricate 
issues related to dual citizenship (Ragazzi&Štiks 2009). The legislation is quite often 
ambiguous as to whether dual citizenship is possible or not in the majority of the newly 
established states. This is so because citizenship also implies loyalty to the state (Bar-Yaacov 
in Boll 2008: 215). In the context of Montenegro’s relationship with Serbia in particular, dual 
citizenship is not only related to participation as argued by Džankid (2010), but also raises 
issues of loyalty to Montenegro. The restrictive Montenegrin citizenship regime allows dual 
citizenship only in certain limited circumstances (see Džankid 2010). In the majority of cases, 
a foreign national is requested to obtain release from his or her other citizenship in order to 
obtain the Montenegrin one (art. 8, para. 2).  
 In line with the current legislation (Law on the Implementation of Constitution of 
Montenegro 2007, art. 12) citizens of Montenegro who possessed dual citizenship on the 
day of proclamation of Montenegro’s independence (3 June 2006) are allowed to retain 
their Montenegrin citizenship (see: Džankid 2010). In addition, the 2008 Montenegrin 
Citizenship Act stipulates that dual citizenship is possible upon the conclusion of an 
international agreement between Montenegro and another country. So far, Montenegro 
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 Residence (prebivalište) is defined as the place of permanent stay, while (boravište) denotes temporary stay. 
Residence, which has to be ‘legal and uninterrupted’, needs to be formally registered with the Ministry of 
Interior. The legal differences between the procedures of registering residence and temporary stay have 
proven to be a barrier to citizenship to a number of displaced persons and IDPs (see EUDO Case Law on 
Montenegro 2010; CEMI 2010).  
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 This would be the case even though the participation in elections is limited by the two year residence 
criterion, as voting preferences are unlikely to suffer a major shift. 
has only concluded a dual citizenship agreement with Macedonia.14 The negotiations for a 
dual citizenship agreement with Serbia reached a dead end early in 2010. The different 
approaches of Montenegro and Serbia to dual citizenship catalysed the issues of 
participation (political and legal aspects of citizenship) and loyalty (emotional aspect of 
citizenship). In Montenegro, the restrictiveness of the citizenship regime is a means of 
consolidating (or at least covering) the internal divisions over identity and statehood. It is 
also a mechanism of preventing any substantial inflow of diaspora-oriented Serbia’s foreign 
policy in Montenegro through dual nationals. In Serbia, the liberal dual citizenship regime 
was primarily adopted as a means of resolving the issue of statelessness (Rava 2010: 27-28). 
However, Serbia’s openness to these bipartite ‘citizenship constellations’ are also related to 
this country’s political influence in the region, especially in the neighbouring countries with 
a significant Serb population (see: Rava 2010; Strategy 2011).  
 
3.2. Prospects of constellations future 
 
Aspirations of membership in ‘citizenship constellations’ entice policymakers to amend 
laws. For the majority of post-communist countries in Europe, including Montenegro, EU 
requirements have caused significant change through the process of Europeanisation, which 
is largely understood as the countries’ adaptation to the norms and standards of the EU and 
other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe (see Džankid 2010). These 
exogenous forces had a cumulative positive effect on the political transformation of 
Montenegro. However, as argued by Swider (2011), the accession of postcommunist states 
to the EU revealed a number of controversies and often generated laws that were less 
liberal or more exclusionary than the previous ones. Montenegro’s Roma were left at the 
outskirts of the country’s citizenship regime largely due to the requirements of visa 
liberalisation process, which reinforces the applicability of Swider’s conclusions on the 
Western Balkans. 
 Visa liberalisation has proven to have been one of the most successful ‘mechanisms 
of change’ (Radaelli 2000, p.15) that the EU applied in the case of the Western Balkans. 
When the Thessalonika Agenda (2003) stipulated the prospect of visa liberalisation for the 
Western Balkans, cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs was considered a 
priority. Montenegro, alongside the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia, was 
considered a soft security threat for the EU, i.e. a transit route for illegal immigrants and 
countries related to organised crime (Schleter 2003, p.7). As a consequence, the EU’s 
Roadmap (2008) for visa liberalisation included specific requirements related to document 
security, illegal immigration, readmission, asylum, public order, judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, and non-discrimination in ensuring its citizens the freedom of 
movement.Hence regulating these matters at the domestic level was essential for 
ascertaining that the citizens of Montenegro would not pose a threat to EU’s external 
borders.  
 However, the requirement to obtainsecure (biometric) documents15had an adverse 
effect in the context of Montenegro’s restrictive citizenship regime. People who previously 
possessed the documents of the FRY but who were not registered as residents of 
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 This agreement does not regulate matters of naturalisations after 3 June 2006 (Džankid 2010). 
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 The requirement to change documents was generated also by Montenegrin independence. Thus, it is 
appropriate to assert that the repercussion created by this requirement has been a combination of 
Montenegrin independence and EU requirements. 
Montenegro were unable to obtain Montenegrin citizenship (and thus Montenegrin 
identification documents). A number of citizens of the successor states of the former 
Yugoslavia had this status, owing to the poorly kept registries during the socialist period, a 
problem analysed in detail by Štiks (2006). Even so, the group of people that was affected 
the most by the need to obtain identification documents were the IDPs (and in particular 
the Roma, Egyptians and Ashkali who fled Kosovo in 1998 and 1999) (CoE 2008: 12). At the 
time of their arrival in Montenegro, this group of people possessed the FRY documents, and 
in order to qualify for the Montenegrin citizenship (provided they fulfil other requirements 
stipulated in art. 8), they would need to obtain further documents from the citizenship 
registries in Kosovo or in Serbia. According to the personal stories collected by UNHCR in 
Montenegro (2010), and the fieldwork for this paper, most of these registries have been 
destroyed.16 As a consequence, many people who fled from Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 are 
unable to obtain the citizenship of either Montenegro or Serbia, which has an exclusionary 
effect on this socially vulnerable group.  
An additional problem, which predominantly affects the RAE population, is the cost 
of obtaining the documents required in order to register as resident aliens in Montenegro, 
which is the first step in the procedure for the admission into Montenegrin citizenship for 
this group of people (CEMI 2010). The RAE people who do not fall under the category 
described above, and whose documents have been preserved, are unable to cover the costs 
of the administrative procedures related to the collection of information from civil registries 
from Serbia or Kosovo.17 This de facto excludes them not only from the Montenegrin 
citizenship, but also from obtaining the minority status and exercising minority rights, as the 
two are related by law. Hence, the formal requirements of the prospect of joining the EU 
‘citizenship constellation’ had a spill over effect in that they created impermeable borders 
for the acquisition of citizenship for the ones who were affected the most by the wars of the 
Yugoslav disintegration. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Bellamy (2004, p. 14) argues that ‘*t+here has been no single trajectory for the development 
of citizenship. It has been played out very differently in different states’. This is particularly 
true for the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, all of which have framed their 
citizenship regimes within the divergent political, social and economic contexts. Although 
largely generated as a result of domestic political competition, citizenship policies in 
Montenegro were also affected by exogenous forces. That is, the development of the 
different aspects of citizenship in Montenegro has been framed through the processes of 
state and nation building in the past two decades. Notwithstanding, citizenship policies in 
Montenegro were a peculiar variant of the post-Yugoslav model, in that citizenship was not 
a mechanism of ethnic homogenisation (Džankid 2010). Yet, neither of these processes 
occured in a vacuum, but in a highly complex regional political environment which took its 
toll on the meaning and regulation of citizenship in Montenegro. 
  Montenegro’s first independent citizenship regime was established by the 2007 
Constitution and the 2008 Montenegrin Citizenship Act. The constitutional provisions 
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 Interview with Slobodan Raščanin, the Senior Protection Clerk at UNHCR Montenegro, Podgorica, 1 July 
2010; Interview at Pravni Centar NGO, Podgorica, 6 July 2010. 
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 Interview with Slobodan Raščanin, the Senior Protection Clerk at UNHCR Montenegro, Podgorica, 1 July 
2010; Interview with Ana Selid, CEMI NGO, Podgorica, 2 July 2010. 
outline the multivalent link between three different aspects of citizenship: citizenship as 
status (establishment of citizenship), citizenship as access (rights and interests), and 
citizenship as means of reinforcing statehood (emphasis on sovereignty, no mention of 
ethnicity). The Constitution defined the scope of Montenegrin citizenship, determining who 
the subjects of the polity are ‘in either a passive or an active sense (that is either as merely 
subjects to its authority or also having certain rights against or over it)’ (Bellamy 2004, p.8). 
Subsequently, the legal aspect of citizenship became a prerogative for the exercise of the 
citizens’ rights, including their participation in the political life of Montenegro. The political 
dimension of citizenship, discernible in active participation, converted the political 
preferences of the citizens of Montenegro into political power. This active, participatory 
element of citizenship was of particular significance in Montenegro in terms of revealing the 
relationship between individuals and their communities of membership. As such, active 
citizenship developed into an identity marker in a society that is still in the process of 
consolidation of the divisions over the Montenegrin statehood and nationhood.  
 Nonetheless, citizenship is far from a static concept and it changes in view of both 
endogenous and exogenous pressures. Hence the birth of Montenegro’s citizenship regime 
was also susceptible to these exogenous influences adjoined through ‘constellations of 
citizenship’, which include the institutional and political legacies of the former Yugoslavia 
and Montenegro’s present aspirations to join the EU. A cobweb of legal and political links 
that Montenegro had with the other republics of the socialist Yugoslavia, and with the 
federal state, reflect Baubock’s argument that ‘states in a strongly intertwined citizenship 
constellation react to each other’s citizenship policies without attempting to coordinate 
them explicitly’ (2010: 850). For instance Montenegro’s relationship with the other post-
Yugoslav states, particular the perplexed bonds with Serbia, has been an essential 
ingredient of the country’s rigid citizenship regime, and the intolerance of dual citizenship. 
In sum, legacies of constellations past have, in the case of Montenegro, generated 
restrictive citizenship practices.  
 By contrast, the prospect of Montenegro’s membership into the EU ‘constellation of 
citizenship’ was followed by a series of political and economic adaptations to the 
requirements of accession. Being related to issues such as judicial cooperation, 
participation, human and minority rights, the concept of citizenship has penetrated to the 
core of the process of socio-political transition. In view of its aspirations to meet the 
conditions of membership in the EU, Montenegro allowed a certain degree of change to its 
citizenship legislation under the aegis of the international actors.  
 Transiting ‘the European route’ has, however, also revealed a major by-product of visa 
liberalisation Montenegro - access to citizenship. Many people – in particular Roma, but also 
other residents of Montenegro - discovered that they formally did not possess Montenegrin 
citizenship, and that they have become non-citizens in a country where they have resided 
habitually for many years (UNHCR 2009: 24-26; Administrative Court Ruling 108/09). As a 
consequence of the permeability of Montenegro’s legislative framework to exogenous 
influence of the EU, paradoxically, the most vulnerable groups of society became excluded 
from the guarantees of status, rights and access enshrined in the very concept of citizenship. 
Hence the idea of a ‘borderless Europe’ has conceived the ‘border-more Balkans’. 
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Table 1. Categories of citizens in Montenegro, current 
 
Category 
 
Description Remarks 
National (državljanin) Person formally in hold of Montenegrin citizenship; that 
is, person who is legally bound to the state of 
Montenegro. 
Sovereignty, franchise, social and 
economic rights are all conferred upon 
people who have established the legal 
link with the Montenegrin state 
(provided that they meet other 
conditions for the conferral of these 
rights) 
 
Citizen (građanin) This term is not defined in the post 2006 legislation of 
Montenegro, although it is commonly used to denote 
civic rights. For previous use, see table 2. 
Sometimes used to denote nationals 
who are active participants to political 
processes (i.e., of age). More often 
used to denote the egalitarian and 
universalistic approach to civic rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Categories of non-citizens in Montenegro, current 
Category Description Approximate 
numbers 
18
 
 
Remarks 
Alien (stranac) 
 
A person who is a citizen of 
another country, or a 
stateless person.  
 
Total aliens:  
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
Resident aliens: 
508 
 
 
Resident aliens need to formally register their 
residence with the Ministry of Interior. Their 
status is approved from the date of registration, 
not in retrospect.   
Refugee /recognised 
refugee (izbjeglica/ lice 
kojem je priznat status 
izbjeglice) 
 
 0 Only 1 person was granted the refugee status in 
Montenegro, but was recently deprived of this 
status (see CEMI 2010).  The government of 
Montenegro maintains that there are no 
‘refugees’ in this country.  
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 Sources: UNHCR Montenegro 2010; CEMI 2010; OSCE 2009. 
Asylum seeker (lice 
kojetražiazil) 
A person who submits the 
request for asylum in 
Montenegro. Once the 
decision has been reached 
the asylum seeker 
becomes a recognised 
refugee.   
7 N/A 
Displaced person 
(raseljeno lice) 
 
People who have fled 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Croatia during the 
conflicts of Yugoslav 
disintegration in the early 
1990s.  
 
5,798 A small number of these people are registered 
aliens, as they had registered with the Ministry of 
Interior.  
Internally displaced person 
(internoraseljeno lice) 
 
Persons who have fled 
Kosovo, during 1998 and 
1999 Kosovo crisis. 
 
10,987 Almost none of the IDPs have registered ‘legal 
and uninterrupted’ residence, because they 
submitted the registration to the Commissariat 
for Refugees and not the Ministry of Interior. 
 
Pre-2006 citizen who is 
currently Serb national 
with registered residence 
in Montenegro (građanin, 
prije 2006) 
 
Persons who have 
registered residence in 
Montenegro before 2006, 
who had FRY citizenship 
and Serbian republican 
citizenship.  
 
25,000 These people After 2006, they are aliens in 
Montenegro, but they have retained some of the 
rights they acquired (e.g., voting rights) 
Stateless person (lice 
bezdržavljanstva) 
Persons who have no legal 
link with any state.  
1,500 Most of the stateless persons in Montenegro are 
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian.  
 
